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This paper explores the ways in which multicultural difference is negotiated in 
Aotearoa/ New Zealand. While New Zealand is officially a bicultural nation, a major 
shift in immigration policy in the late 1980s has caused a rapid move towards an 
increasingly multicultural, and globally networked, nation. However, this is rarely 
reflected in its national cinema, which largely continues to operate within a bicultural 
framework. This paper is based on cross-cultural focus group research with three 
different communities: Maori, Croatian and Chinese. The study took the 1996 film 
Broken English (directed by Gregor Nicholas) as a starting point to analyse the fluid 
boundaries between national, diasporic and indigenous identities, as they move 
between public and private spaces. In the process, it draws conclusions about the 
limitations of official discourses in the management of cultural difference, and 
debunks many widely-held assumptions about cultural maintenance and integration. 
The paper applies a framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1995, 
1998, Laclau, 2000, Van Dijk, 1998, 2000) to the data and, while focused on a New 
Zealand context, it allows for productive comparison to the Australian one. 
 
In terms of the ethnic composition of its population, New Zealand is clearly a 
multicultural nation. Broken English is an important exception to the dearth of 
diversified imagery, in that it deliberately sets out to represent a multicultural New 
Zealand. The film has differed from acclaimed bicultural projects, of which Once 
Were Warriors (1994, Lee Tamahori) and Whale Rider (2003, Nikki Caro) are clear 
examples. It represents a Pakeha perspective on multiculturalism, where otherness is 
clearly defined against a Pakeha yardstick.  
 
The production personnel of Broken English consisted mostly of Pakeha New 
Zealanders, while the film features virtually no Pakeha characters. This raises issues 
of power and representation. In other words, who has the power to define whom, and 
for whose benefit? Although Broken English presents a number of different ethnic 
communities in New Zealand (Croatian, Maori, Chinese and Cook Islands), these 
communities are ultimately not represented by and for themselves but, rather, on 
someone else’s terms. In addition, these representations are directed mostly at a 
mainstream (thus, largely Pakeha) audience. This situation may easily lead to ‘exotic 
othering’ and, while the film does this to a certain extent, it also retains a certain 
ambiguity on this aspect. Director Nicholas has argued that he did not want to treat 
these communities with ‘kid gloves.’ However, this in turn leads to a situation where 
these communities are positioned to some extent as a ‘social problem’ (as carrying 
‘baggage’ into New Zealand), literally removed from mainstream society, with the 
absence of Pakeha characters. Within this cinematic ‘ethnoscape,’ the film displays an 
extraordinary concern with ‘cultural detail’ (such as food rituals, dance and colourful 
clothing), which ultimately leads to representations that rarely move beyond 
stereotypes.  
 
Within the overall context of New Zealand cinema, Broken English can be seen as an 
important text, and as part of a postcolonial negotiation of nationhood and national 
Huijser – Negotiating Multicultural Difference in a Bicultural Nation 2
identity. The problematic ways in which it engages with its subject matter illustrates 
the complex nature of such negotiations. The film presents a version of New Zealand 
that is culturally and ethnically diverse. In this way, it moves away from hegemonic 
accounts of New Zealand which are still, to a large extent, framed in either 
monocultural or bicultural terms. This could be attributed to recent changes in 
immigration policy, which have created an increasingly diverse population, 
particularly in Auckland where the filmmakers are based, and where the film’s story 
takes place. On one level, Broken English is an important attempt to bring different 
minority groups into the mainstream, and represents an inclusive version of the nation. 
The problematic ways in which it does this, however, illustrates the complexities 
involved. Although partially due to the constraints of film as a medium, and the 
resultant pressures of presenting complex subject matter in approximately one and a 
half hours, Broken English ultimately positions the different ethnic groups it 
represents outside of the mainstream. Being currently one of the few circulating 
cinematic versions of New Zealand nationhood that engages with ethnic and cultural 
diversity, the film bears additional representational weight.  
 
The focus groups for this study were selected according to ethnic background, 
generational difference, and urban and rural/provincial backgrounds and contexts. 
Broken English represents a number of different ethnic groups that are clearly marked 
as such. Moreover, their ethnicity can be seen as one of the major organising 
principles of their respective characterisations. The two main characters are Croatian 
and Maori, while the supporting characters are of Chinese, Cook Island and Japanese 
descent. Within the sub-plot, the Chinese characters play the most important part. The 
selection of participants was based on this recognition, and it became important to 
select participants who identified themselves according to these categories. There was 
also the option of choosing only Pakeha participants. However, from the outset, this 
study was based on a recognition that ethnic minority groups in New Zealand were 
marginalised in mainstream discourses about the nation, albeit to varying degrees. 
Therefore, targeting different ethnic minority groups, as opposed to the dominant 
ethnic group, seemed an obvious way of gaining a range of responses related to the 
central issues of this study. This influenced the type of knowledge gained; in a sense, 
ethnic minorities were given a forum to address the mainstream. The study aimed to 
target the more critical audience members, those likely to be reflective about ethnic 
characterisation.  
 
The following six groups were selected for the focus group study: 
1) Croatian: New Zealand born or long-term residents  
2) Croatian: recent immigrants (arrival after 1990)/mixed 
3) Chinese: New Zealand born or long-term residents 
4) Chinese: recent immigrants (arrival after 1990)  
5) Maori: urban residents 
6) Maori: rural/ provincial background  
 
The Croatian groups were made up of members of the Croatian Cultural Society in 
Auckland. One of the Chinese groups was made up of members of the Auckland 
Chinese Community Centre, while the other consisted of members from various 
student associations. For the Maori groups, one consisted of media students at 
Auckland University, the other of family and friends. This selection process clearly 
demands a strong sense of self-reflexivity and an awareness of the role of the 
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researcher while employed in the analysis of the data.  
 
The group discussions followed a screening of the film and lasted, in general, between 
an hour and an hour and a half.  
 
 
National/ Diasporic Identity and the Bi-/ Multi-culturalism Debate  
 
Discourses of race, ethnicity and culture are highly context-specific, and the focus 
group discussions were thus intimately related to the way different participants situate 
themselves, both individually and as a group, within a wider national context, and 
particularly in relation to bicultural and multicultural debates in New Zealand.  
 
Discussions about biculturalism and multiculturalism in New Zealand are often 
framed in an either/or fashion, and within this, New Zealand has made a ‘choice’ to 
pursue biculturalism as a state policy (at least in official terms). Since the 1970s, the 
Treaty of Waitangi has occupied a central place in this official policy. As John Pratt 
asserts, ‘the Treaty of Waitangi cemented into New Zealand culture and political life 
the idea that relations between Maori and Pakeha- colonisers and colonised- should be 
conducted on the basis of a ‘partnership of equals’ (1999, p.316). But, as Nina Nola 
argues, ‘official biculturalism is a prescriptive rather than descriptive definition, and 
as such marginalises ethnic minority groups who do not see themselves represented 
under the umbrella term “Pakeha,” while at the same time presupposing a 
homogeneous “British” culture as the binary opposite to Maori’ (2000, p.207; see also 
Mohanram, 1998, Ip, 1998). In other words, biculturalism excludes important sections 
of New Zealand society, at least in official discourses. It is precisely this underlying 
binary structure that leads Ramesh Thakur to the following conclusion:  
 
The debate in New Zealand is about biculturalism, not multiculturalism: the 
two are mutually exclusive. The Maori are the oldest immigrants to New 
Zealand, and Pakeha the second oldest. Groups which are neither Maori nor 
European are frozen out of the debate on the identity and future of the country 
and disenfranchised with respect to the politics of multiculturalism. They are 
rendered impotent in setting the agenda of the debate or defining its conceptual 
vocabulary. (1995, p.271/272) 
 
Thakur’s comments raises a number of issues. Firstly, it draws attention to the 
temporal hierarchy that biculturalism establishes. This hierarchy tends to lead to a 
situation where:  
 
biculturalism is seen as the central platform from which a future multicultural 
society will be launched. The argument goes like this: in order to develop a 
model of ethnic relations that can answer to the democratic demands of a 
whole range of minority groups, it will first be necessary to develop 
representational structures that will empower the largest minority group. 
(Maxwell, 1998, p.199) 
 
It is in the reaction to this argument that the confusion between different 
‘culturalisms,’ as official policy and everyday experience, becomes clear. Consider, 
for instance, the following statement by Rajen Prasad (former Race Relations 
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Conciliator): ‘I don’t think it’s as simple as saying, “First achieve biculturalism, then 
we’ll look at multiculturalism.” One can’t wait for the other’ (qtd. in Nola, 2000, 
p.207). Indeed, everyday multiculturalism does not wait, but official multiculturalism 
is a political project and, therefore, it is possible to put it on hold, or ‘silence’ it in 
mainstream discourse. This means that some groups are constructed as ‘latecomers,’ 
and, in Homi Bhabha’s words, these ‘supplementary’ groups ‘by being “after” the 
original, or in “addition to,” it gives [them] the advantage of introducing a sense of 
“secondariness” or belatedness into the structure of the original’ (1990, p.305). They 
have the ability to ‘disturb the calculation’ (Bhabha, p.305) of meaning and 
representation. 
 
Whereas a ‘multicultural’ position argues that biculturalism is too limiting and not 
inclusive enough, an ‘indigenous’ position is often based on the idea that biculturalism 
does not go far enough in terms of its inherent promise of power sharing. Radhika 
Mohanram draws attention to this power aspect when she writes that, ‘the concept of 
equitable power-sharing, so desirable for both Maori and Pakeha, is ultimately 
revealed to be something that can be initiated only by Pakeha, because it is Pakeha 
who control the resources’ (1998, p.26). In terms of similarities, both positions could 
be seen as attacking Eurocentrism, albeit with differing emphases. From a 
multicultural position, the aim is to ‘graft bits of diversity onto a mainstream core’ 
(Fleras and Spoonley, 1999, p.246). In other words, it is aimed at creating a space to, 
firstly, recognise and respect cultural diversity and, secondly, to incorporate this 
diversity into mainstream society and culture. This is what Charles Taylor has called 
‘the politics of recognition’ (1992/1994). From an indigenous position, however, the 
aim is not so much to be incorporated into an existing political structure, but rather to 
reconfigure and redefine that structure. This applies to politics, as well as institutions 
throughout society. 
 
In this section then, the emphasis moves away somewhat from Broken English to a 
more general and political discussion about national identity. As these debates 
generally followed discussions about the film, they can be partly seen to continue on a 
particular ‘discursive track’ that each group had already established. However, 
moving away from the context of the film also created a space in most cases to talk 
about national and individual identity in a different framework. This generally 




Croatian Groups (Group 1 and Group 2) 
 
Both Croatian groups were initially working towards a consensus on the way 
‘Croatians’ were represented in Broken English. This entailed the construction of a 
different version of Croatian culture and identity, one in which ‘history’ meant not 
only the Croatian homeland, but also the Croatian part of New Zealand’s past. Both 
groups made frequent references to the earliest Croatian immigrants to New Zealand 
in the nineteenth century and their history on the gum fields of Northland. There was a 
strong feeling in these groups that this part of New Zealand’s history has not been 
adequately represented in mainstream versions of constructing nationhood. In other 
words, they felt that this part of history was silenced, making the representation in 
Broken English even more difficult to accept. The following exchange, which still 
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deals with the film, shows the extent to which these kinds of emotions were stirred up 
in some participants: 
 
Kate:  It upset me that in New Zealand, the country we have made what it is... 
Mary:  Ooohh... 
Trish:  Helped made...helped made... 
 
Of course, the other two participants recognise here that Kate is getting a little carried 
away, but this serves to illustrate the very real anger that these groups expressed. 
Driven by emotions, Kate strongly constructs Croatian immigrants as the primary 
builders of New Zealand as a nation, which is subsequently modified because of group 
dynamics.  
 
What is interesting here, from a researcher’s point of view, is the complex overlap 
between concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘culture’; in other words, where can the boundaries 
between these concepts be located, and how important are perceived views from the 
‘outside’ in a relational sense? For example, consider the following: 
 
Trish:  I’m telling you openly and honestly that this film is actually 
propaganda, to destroy the image of Croatian people in New Zealand 
and also in Croatia. Because you know, when we went through this 
stage of very recent war, we were a nation in pain. And for a long time 
nobody heard us..alright? We were described as a fascist, as a very, 
very bad nation. And it took ten years for the world to realise who 
really is a fascist; what’s really going on in our country. You see, we 
didn’t cry and beg and ask; we fought ourselves. (my emphasis) 
 
There is an interesting ‘slippage’ here between ‘the nation-as-state’ and ‘the nation-as-
people,’ which surfaced in all groups at times, but particularly in the Croatian groups. 
Thus, ‘New Zealand’ refers here to ‘the nation-as state’ and to the geographical 
territory, which is seen as the immediate everyday context, whereas ‘a nation in pain’ 
transcends geographical boundaries and appropriates a more cultural sense of 
nationhood. It refers to an ‘imagined community’ of Croatians worldwide, with a 
common ‘imagined homeland’ (‘our country’), and in this way can be seen as an 
important part of diasporic identity formation. The reference to ‘the world’ in this 
extract draws attention to the transnational nature of such an identity. This discursive 
slippage serves a dual purpose: it functions as a way to claim a space within New 
Zealand as a nation, and it also differentiates Croatian identity strategically from other 
ethnic groups within New Zealand. This latter move is one way to resist being 
subsumed into the larger category of New Zealander, or ‘Pakeha.’  
 
The complex ways in which these different functions overlap became more evident 
when the participants were specifically asked to define New Zealand as a nation, and 
their own position within it. Interestingly, when these groups talked about New 
Zealand as a nation, they often drew on mainstream discourses, such as New Zealand 
being an ‘egalitarian society’: 
 
Mary: …love New Zealand; what a wonderful feeling it was that you...like you 
go into butcher shop. It doesn’t matter if you’re a farmer, and next to 
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you there’s a specialist, eye specialist or somebody. You are just as 
important as he is. And sometimes in European countries, it’s not like 
that. New Zealand is just wonderful. And I’m very, very happy, very 
privileged to get here.  
Trish:  Wherever you go, there is people from all over the world here; French, 
Italian, German, Dutch, Chinese, Islanders, Maoris. We’ve proven that 
we can all live together in one country. 
Jenny:  New Zealand is a lovely country, and I love it; most of our Croatian 
people love it in New Zealand. New Zealand gives us freedom. We can 
do whatever we like, and as long as we respect the law and pay taxes, 
there’s no problem. And also, we fit very well with other nationalities.  
 
New Zealand is here positively constructed in opposition to Europe, which is 
characterised by deeply entrenched class structures. It sets up a dichotomy between 
the ‘old world’ (Europe) and the ‘new’ (New Zealand), a dynamic that draws on 
historical colonial discourse. This shows the flexibility of these discourses in terms of 
their appropriation for various contexts, as contrasts sharply with earlier constructions 
of Europe as ‘civilised,’ rather than ‘barbaric.’ 
 
In addition, virtually all participants in both groups stressed that this was a 
multicultural nation. That said, there was an awareness that ‘we’ don’t always 
represent ‘ourselves’ as such: 
 
Kate:  We very much portray ourselves as a Maori country, don’t we? But we 
are very multicultural. 
 
In this context, ‘we’ quite clearly refers to ‘New Zealanders’ in general, rather than 
‘Croatians.’ Also, ‘multicultural’ is appropriated in the sense of ‘multiculturalism as 
fact,’ rather than ‘official multiculturalism.’ This was the dominant mode in which the 
term ‘multiculturalism’ was used in both groups, with some relatively covert 
references to its more political implications: 
 
Naomi: We all have equal rights. I think we are multicultural, very 
multicultural. (.) I think New Zealand is coping very well with multi-
ethnic groups. (.) We all respect each other’s cultures, which maybe 
thirty years ago some didn’t. (.) People are not having to change their 
names anymore, Anglocise it; so really, the multi-ethnic people are 
getting a bit stronger, and they want their rights, including Maoris. You 
know, they want their language recognised and they want their cultures 
respected a bit more and so on, and I think that’s a good thing.  
 
This qualifies the earlier glowing construction of New Zealand as an ‘egalitarian 
paradise,’ as it acknowledges that this has historically not been the case. It also 
constructs multiculturalism as different ethnic groups living side by side while 
retaining their differences, the metaphor of a ‘mosaic,’ rather than a ‘melting pot.’  
 
Overall, Group 1 discussed national identity in these relatively general terms. All 
participants in this group had migrated to New Zealand more than thirty or forty years 
ago. They were thus firmly settled in New Zealand. All of them were actively 
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involved in forms of cultural maintenance, as is reflected in their emphasis on their 
community’s reputation in New Zealand.  
 
In contrast, most of the participants in Group 2 were relatively recent migrants, and 
the discussion in this group took quite a different turn. For the more recent immigrants 
in Group 2, the emphasis in relation to national identity focused on individual identity. 
Within these expressions of identity formation, some key themes emerged which are 
typical of diaspora identities, like ‘dislocation’ and ‘in-between’ positions. Broken 
English can be seen as an attempt to represent some of these themes. According to 
these groups, however, the film does not do it very successfully. The following extract 
is quoted at length because it fittingly captures the main dilemmas and contradictions 
inherent in these positions: 
 
Lisa: What do I think of New Zealand as a nation? 
HH: Yes, how would you describe it? And how do you see your own place 
within it? 
Lisa: It’s like asking me what New Zealand culture is. It’s still not defined; 
it’s still searching for a nation and searching for a culture, and 
searching for identity, very much so. And personally, as a passport 
holder, I hold a New Zealand and Croatian passport. I’m probably 
searching for identity as well. I feel very much de-rooted from Croatia, 
and I don’t feel completely belonging here, because....One reason is the 
accent, another reason is that there are things happening in this society 
that I can’t associate with, and I get bitter about And then, you know, I 
try to distance myself and say I don’t really belong here; I should not 
really get involved. And then I think again and I say, but my daughter 
is here and she is a kiwi by birth, and I should get involved because I 
should make it better for her. I’m very confused, and I think I’m in a 
typical straightjacket of an immigrant, who has lost, you know, the 
traditional sort of linkages. There are different types of immigrants, or 
immigrants from Croatia. There is a type of gastarbeiters that went to 
Western Europe and used to work there, but still hold very strong links 
with back home; you know, they have different sort of problems. And 
there’s us here, very far from Croatia. Although we do keep in contact, 
physically you’re not there and you’re forgotten most of the time by 
your friends and your relatives, except on Christmas and birthdays. 
And things have changed radically. And you did not take...at least I’m 
speaking for myself, I did not take part in those changes and so I can’t 
claim ownership over that. And here I also don’t feel, you know...So I 
live in a micro-world. I feel very much at home at my work and at my 
home, but in between I’m just a visitor. And I very often behave like 
that.  
 
Firstly, Lisa draws here on a number of elements that influence a sense of national 
identity and belonging to an ‘imagined community’: language (‘accent’) is one factor, 
birthplace another (‘kiwi by birth’). In addition, there are elements like family ties and 
historical factors, linked to geography. These kind of elements work together to 
different degrees and in different configurations. Depending on specific contexts, any 
one of these elements may become salient.  
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In short, this shows common aspects of diaspora identities and it complicates the 
notion of hybridity. There are feelings of being ‘in-between’ cultures and feelings of 
longing for a ‘homeland.’ But, as other participants in this group noted, this ‘imagined 
homeland’ is often exposed as a myth by what I would call ‘the shock of return.’ At 
that moment of return, the migrant is fixed in a kind of permanent limbo, or the 
feeling of being ‘forever foreigner.’ This realisation is not necessarily negative, and 
can be an advantage in certain contexts, but as the above extract shows (‘I live in a 
micro-world’), the ‘celebratory’ undertones inherent in some theoretical notions of 
hybridity are not warranted. 
 
This extract also draws attention to the complexity and heterogeneity of diasporic 
identities. The term ‘diaspora’ as a homogeneous category is too limited (Sinclair and 
Cunningham, 2000). While diasporic identity formation, by definition, involves 
negotiation between ‘the here and there,’ it is highly context-specific and influenced 
by a wide variety of factors, both in the ‘original homeland’ and the ‘adopted 
homeland.’ These factors include political developments (e.g. war), but also personal 
factors like family circumstances (e.g. children), and the level of cultural maintenance.  
 
For example, a couple of participants in Group 2 were born in New Zealand and have 
lived here all their lives. They nevertheless identify first and foremost as ‘Croatian’: 
 
Ruth: In my own life, I’ve always thought of myself as a Croatian who 
happened to be born in New Zealand. (.) I feel it goes beyond where 
you’re born. Going to school not knowing English, hearing all the other 
children talking about what they did with their grandparents; you’re an 
outsider, you’re a foreigner. Doesn’t matter whether you’re born here. 
Going to the shop, speaking with your mother in Croatian, turning to 
the counter and speaking to the woman in English; that chop and 
change. You’re not a kiwi, you can’t be and you never will be. 
 
This shows that ‘dislocation’ is not necessarily a prerequisite of diasporic identity 
formation, although it can be a strong factor in some cases. Ruth constructs national 
identity as consisting of two main elements: birthright versus language, with language 
being the dominant factor. The implication is that if one of these two elements is 
missing, there is no complete sense of national identity. 
 
The participants in this group were aware of my own status as recent immigrant and 
‘non-British European.’ This may partly explain why the discussion about ‘national 
identity’ was mostly framed in terms of personal experience, as there was a sense of 
common understanding which was often implicitly referred to in terms of ‘you know 




Chinese Groups (Group 3 and Group 4) 
 
Group 3 was scheduled to be held at the Auckland Chinese Community Centre in 
Auckland. This group took a long time to organise, around four to five months after 
first contact was made with the organisation. There were a number of reasons for this, 
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one of them being that the organisation was preparing celebrations for its thirty year 
anniversary when I first approached them. My correspondence took place by phone 
and mail, mostly through the Vice-Chairwoman of the organisation and, in the later 
stages, through the Chairman, both of whom were present on the evening in question. 
I explained the aims and objectives of my research thoroughly and repeatedly to both, 
in writing, in person, and by phone. The focus group consisted of six members of the 
Community Centre, and one outsider: five men and two women. Their ages ranged 
from mid-thirties to late-seventies. While one participant was a recent arrival, the 
majority had settled here thirty to forty years ago. I arrived with a friend who is fluent 
in both Mandarin and Cantonese, which had been agreed upon beforehand. She was to 
take part in the discussion as well. On arrival, the participants spoke in Cantonese 
amongst themselves, but all had a reasonable understanding of English. On this 
occasion, they had come to the Centre especially to take part in this focus group. 
 
From the moment I started playing the videotape of Broken English, most participants 
talked amongst themselves, apparently not concentrating much on the film. I had 
introduced myself beforehand and explained what my research entailed. I had also 
warned them that the film contained some fairly explicit material: sex scenes, violence 
and offensive language. Although I had on numerous occasions notified the 
‘gatekeepers’ of the duration of the film (about one hour and a half), one of them told 
me he thought that was a little too long, just as we were about to roll the tape. After 
about five minutes, he called me over and asked whether it was a documentary or a 
drama. I told him again that it was a drama, set in Auckland. The talking continued 
until about twenty minutes into the film. This was the start of a rather explicit sex 
scene between the characters of Nina and Eddie, and something extraordinary 
happened. Almost immediately, everyone got up and appeared to be highly offended 
by this scene. The chairman told me this was ‘too much’ and that it offended them 
greatly. He also told me this was the end of the session, as they were no longer willing 
to cooperate. I stopped the tape and apologised, saying it was never my intention to 
offend. My apologies were accepted but I was told that the film was considered 
pornographic, which causes embarrassment in ‘our culture,’ particularly since there 
were women in the room. As my friend and I were shown out, I apologised again and 
I was told that there are ‘too many cultural differences’ for this to work successfully.  
 
Reflecting on events afterwards, a number of factors could have played a role in the 
‘failure’ of this particular group. Firstly, my own role could obviously be questioned 
here. Organising and conducting focus groups put me on a steep learning curve during 
the course of this research project; I had no first hand experience. Although I thought I 
had explained my aims and objectives thoroughly, I could perhaps have done more in 
that respect. Also, in this particular case, cross-cultural factors clearly had an impact 
on the event and, although I had some assistance, it may have worked better if I had 
not been present myself. Subsequent conversations with my ‘assistant’ indicated that 
she was rather surprised as well. She, at first, thought it came down to a ‘generation 
gap’ and, second, considered this group to be rather ‘rude.’ In terms of the generation 
gap, Xuelin Zhou argues that the treatment of sex and sexuality in general in Chinese 
cinema was heavily censored for the entire period since the Communist Revolution 
until the so-called ‘youth films’ of the late 1980s (2001). Explicitness in this respect 
was generally regarded as ‘decadent’ and ‘vulgar.’ Considering the age bracket of the 
participants, this could have been a major influence here. Secondly, on a more 
practical level, my ‘assistant’ has since made some enquiries at the University of 
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Auckland, which indicate that researchers have experienced problems before with this 
particular organisation. In other words, acquiring some background information about 
this particular organisation beforehand, which I failed to do, could have led to the 
selection of another organisation. The day after this event, I sent a letter apologising 
for any offence caused and taking full responsibility for this.  
 
The discussion about national identity in Group 4 centred on political themes, and 
specifically debates about bi-culturalism and multi-culturalism. This group identified 
some major contradictions in the way these debates are framed in a New Zealand 
context. Significantly, the participants felt they were largely excluded from this 
debate, and felt clearly positioned on the margins. The main difference with the 
Croatian groups was that Group 4’s feeling extended beyond political debates to 
‘everyday’ contexts. Rhetorically, however, a fair amount of effort went into assuring 
an impression of agency. The personal choice element of immigration was stressed 
repeatedly. On a micro-level, this can be partly related to my position in this group. 
That is, participants were clearly concerned not to be seen to be complaining to an 
‘outsider connected to the mainstream,’ as the following extract shows: 
 
Jimmy: I mean, I like New Zealand. It was my choice. I chose the country, and 
I still think...it is a big space with few people, and a lot of nature. 
Culturally, I don’t mind that the culture has become more and more 
Asian, obviously. (.) People are getting more ambitious, but the 
average New Zealanders are still relaxed, a rather laid back culture.  
Hailey: For New Zealand, most people say, you know, that more and more 
migrants come from Asia, and that the nation is multicultural. But the 
reality is...I have to say this...there is the Maori culture and the Pakeha 
culture. So there’s only two cultures. And for the others...ethnic 
peoples, just like me.  
Frank:  I don’t think New Zealand is a multicultural society, because...what 
you can see from the film. Yeah, it’s quite separate; separate along the 
lines of mainstream society and minorities...yeah.  
 
Jimmy clearly wants to stress the positive aspects of New Zealand, and emphasises his 
own choice to migrate here. In doing so, he relies extensively on mainstream 
discourses of national identity such as a ‘clean, green country’ and a ‘laid back 
attitude,’ which is also the core message of the nation’s tourist literature. However, 
through his use of ‘New Zealanders,’ he clearly positions himself outside of this 
category, which was particularly common for the more recent migrants in this group. 
Again, we can see an interesting slippage between ‘culture’ and ‘race’ here: when he 
notes that the ‘culture’ has become more and more Asian, he is most likely talking 
about a more visible Asian presence, but this is rather unclear. ‘Culture,’ then, 
functions as a nodal point. 
 
The other two participants adopt a more critical position, although in Hailey's case 
almost apologetically so (‘I have to say this’). She specifically critiques bicultural 
imaginings of New Zealand, and implies that these imaginings marginalise different 
ethnic groups outside the norm (Maori and Pakeha) as ethnic. In other words, the 
norm does not have to be named as such (Dyer, 1997). Similarly, Frank offers a 
critique of the official version of multiculturalism as a ‘mosaic,’ by implying that this 
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itself causes marginalisation.  
 
The participants who have been in New Zealand longer expressed similar concerns, 
but were more confident about expressing them: 
 
Casey: Even though politicians or the media keep emphasising that New 
Zealand is a multicultural society...well, I really don’t think so, because 
when we go to schools, even like the subject we study, they just focus 
on Maori education or  Pacific Island education, but they never put the 
focus on Asians. Like how to  accommodate their different learning 
needs, or even the Greeks or South Africans or other minority groups. 
So I don’t think...I think there is still improvement we can anticipate.  
Chanelle: Okay, I think New Zealand is a monocultural country (everyone 
laughs), honestly. I mean, people are aware of issues like Maori and 
Pacific Island culture and New Zealanders of different cultural, ethnic 
groups in this country. But these groups are not involved in any 
decision making at all, not on any level, national level or community 
level. And I think until one day that we could really share a partnership 
with these different cultural groups, or ethnic groups, then we can’t 
really say that it’s a multicultural country.  
 
The emphasis shifts from ‘national identity’ in a general sense to a more political 
discourse of cultural rights (and note again the slippage with ‘ethnic’). On a micro-
level, the somewhat nervous laughter at ‘a monocultural country’ may indicate that 
the other participants largely agree with this, but feel reluctant to express it in such a 
strong and straightforward manner, particularly in a semi-public context.  
 
The difference between Casey and Chanelle in the above extract is that Casey 
expresses frustration with a bicultural discourse, and Chanelle constructs a sharper 
dichotomy between the ‘empty signifier’ Pakeha and the rest. The former shows 
parallels with the way this was discussed in the Croatian groups (a similar frustration 
with the limitations and marginalising tendencies of bicultural discourses), whereas 
the latter is more confrontational and more directly concerned with contemporary and 
historical sources of power. In this way, it is closer related to discourses that the 
Maori groups draw on, albeit for different reasons.  
 
Finally, despite these critiques of bicultural discourses, the Treaty of Waitangi, which 
is often seen as the document that legitimises these, was never explicitly mentioned in 
either the Croatian or Chinese groups, nor in the Maori groups. Particularly in the 
latter case, this was surprising, as both Maori groups drew extensively on bicultural 
discourses in relation to national identity. It is difficult to gauge the reasons for this, 
but my hypothesis is that it is due to two reasons: first, the Treaty may have achieved 
the status of empty signifier and, second, the term could be seen as too 
overdetermined in terms of its political connotations, thereby hampering the 
construction of a clear argument. Seen in this way, the former would relate to the 
Maori groups in that it ‘goes without saying’ that the arguments are based on the 
Treaty as ‘founding document’ (I return to this shortly). The latter would apply to the 
other groups, in that the Treaty instantly invokes a bicultural version of the nation, on 
which these groups were at pains to critique.  
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Maori Groups (5 and 6)   
 
In both Maori groups, as with the Chinese group, general discussions about ‘national 
identity’ quickly took a political form. Within these discussions, there was an 
interesting tension between what is, and what should be. Both groups firmly 
positioned Maori at the centre, as a group with certain rights which should override 
those of other groups. In a way, they constructed a hierarchy that is historical in 
nature. Not surprisingly then, the ‘biculturalism first’-discourse was fairly dominant, 
accompanied necessarily by critiques of immigration policy. To an important extent, 
multiculturalism can be seen as a strategy to come to terms with a perceived 
disruption of the ‘homogeneous’ nation, as Jon Stratton argues, ‘[h]omogeneity, of 
language and culture as well as race, was, throughout the nineteenth century and up 
until very recently, the most basic concern of the nation’ (1998, p.9). Within this 
context, there is a crucial distinction to be made between multiculturalism as a lived 
reality, and multiculturalism as a state policy. Stratton talks about the difference 
between everyday multiculturalism, ‘the mixing, merging and reworking of cultural 
forms in people’s everyday lives’ (1998, p.34), and official multiculturalism. This is 
an important distinction, which can equally be applied to biculturalism: everyday 
multiculturalism recognises hybridity as part of everyday life. In contrast, official 
multiculturalism tends to fix cultural identities as a kind of ‘mosaic.’ Official 
multiculturalism has this ‘fixing’ effect because of its paradoxical need to define 
cultural identity in a neat and static manner.  
 
Despite the strong critiques of official multiculturalism, and particularly immigration 
policy, in these groups, there was also a clear recognition that multiculturalism was a 
‘fact’ in everyday life, and that this was not necessarily negative. The political 
implications, however, were read as potentially negative, from a Maori point of view. 
In short, the emphasis focused on issues of power in relation to these concepts: 
 
Nicole: It’s not a bicultural country; it’s a multicultural country. 
Libby: I don’t think New Zealand has ever come to grips with biculturalism. 
Moana: No, same, and also it just seems that everyone comes and just hangs 
out in their own separate groups. And there’s just not that much 
interaction or mixing between them.  
Libby: I don’t think New Zealand is multicultural. You have a lot of different 
cultures, but they can’t even deal with biculturalism. (.) New Zealand 
can’t deal with biculturalism, and yet they embrace all these other 
cultures as a means of diverting biculturalism and going straight to 
multi. I think it’s a way of forgetting about the biculturalism between 
tangata whenua [literal translation: people of the land] and Pakeha. 
And when you have  multiculturalism, it sort of pushes biculturalism 
to the side. That’s my view of it.  
Libby:  But it kind of lumps minorities together aye? 
Margot: Yeah, and also pushes Maori into the multicultural group, do you 
know what I mean? 
 
Apart from the initial statements in this extract, which refer to ‘everyday 
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multiculturalism,’ the emphasis is clearly on ‘official multiculturalism.’ 
Multiculturalism is being criticised as a policy with important implications for 
national power relations in New Zealand. Libby, in particular, uses language which is 
central to this process, such as ‘diverting’ and ‘forgetting.’ Her critique is highly 
sophisticated and matches political critiques of biculturalism. Within the power 
relations thus invoked, there is a concern that Maori are ‘pushed to the margins’ of the 
multicultural ‘mosaic,’ the largest piece of which is seen as Pakeha.  
 
There are clear echoes here of ‘Maori sovereignty’ discourse, including its essentialist 
notions of ‘culture,’ but there is a sense that multiculturalism as an official policy, and 
by extension immigration policy, is responsible for this situation. This discourse of 
sovereignty is thus employed for strategic reasons: 
 
Margot: People come into this country and they think that New Zealand is 
Pakeha, you know what I mean? So they sort of try to integrate into a 
Pakeha society, whereas I think what they need to realise is that this 
culture is, and should always be, a Maori cultural society. And they 
should integrate into that first, and then fit into what their environment 
is calling for, or what they wanted to.  
 
There are some interesting contradictions in this argument, which appear to arise from 
discrepancies between ‘official’ and ‘everyday’ versions. Margot firstly challenges a 
bicultural discourse of New Zealand by invoking a monocultural Maori version, which 
she argues should be the dominant ‘culture’ on which a New Zealand identity is 
based. She then draws on an assimilationist discourse which demands ‘integration’ 
with Maori, before cultural maintenance. The former relates to official policy, while 
the latter refers to everyday contexts. This clearly shows how these two contradictory 
notions often overlap.  
 
The discussion developed an implicit critique of the power of decision-making in New 
Zealand and, by extension, to who is included in that process. There was a feeling that 
Maori do not have enough influence on political decisions, something that quickly 
became explicit: 
 
Libby:  I think we’re too small for that [American style ‘melting pot’]. I think 
we’d get swallowed up. It’s just the dominant culture which has ruled 
basically, and hasn’t really allowed Maori in...except for consultation 
and on ceremonial occasions. Other than that, they’re not there in 
policy; it’s only to consult with (‘what do you think of this?’), but 
they’re not there as decision makers. Right through government, except 
for the Maori Department, which is ultimately run by Pakeha. (.) What 
we’ve had is consultation; we’ve never had a process. 
 
Within this discourse, the first ‘we’ refers to New Zealanders in general, whereas the 
second ‘we’ refers to Maori. These two positions are occupied interchangeably, 
depending on the context, in a seemingly unproblematic way. On a micro-level, 
sensing that these views might be perceived as ‘radical,’ Libby interrupted herself 
here and almost apologetically said ‘sorry, you’ve stirred me up,’ before further 
developing her argument: 
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Libby:  I’ve never really agreed with the multiculturalism concept. I think it 
just comes in, bulldozes over biculturalism, and they say ‘hey, what are 
you worrying about?,’ you know, ‘there’s this culture here, and this...,’ 
you know? (.) I know there’s a lot of people who are sick of Maori 
moaning and complaining about the same thing. But it’s never been 
addressed properly for any process of healing to take place. In order for 
healing to take place, you’ve gotta address the past and what’s 
happened.  
 
This argument was subsequently reinforced by a number of examples of historical 
grievances, especially in education. Importantly, there is a high level of awareness of 
mainstream discourses in relation to these grievances, but these are confidently 
countered. She constructs a version of the nation as a historical organism which can, 
and needs to be, healed before ‘we’ as ‘an imagined community’ can move forward 
through calendrical time (Anderson, 1991). In this way, Libby talked about the 
friction between biculturalism and multiculturalism almost exclusively in political 
terms. Although there was a broad consensus in this group in a political sense, some 
participants interrupted this political focus on a number of occasions with ‘everyday’ 
aspects of multiculturalism, as in the following exchange: 
 
Libby: Just because a lot of different people live here doesn’t mean that we all 
live together. 
Nicole: Yeah, but we have to. We live in the same country. We’re gonna have 
to find bridges, you know? 
Moana: Yeah, but where is the interaction? I don’t know, how many Croatians 
do you know? 
Libby: I mean, it depends what you mean by multiculturalism.  
Nicole: Well, we’re many nations... 
Libby: We are multi...we are many nations, yes, New Zealand is now many 
nations. However, because we haven’t addressed that biculturalism, I 
don’t think it paves the way for a multicultural nation.  
Margot: That’s the thing; it is multicultural but it is not harmonious. 
Nicole: I’m not saying it is. I’m just saying that’s just the way it is. That’s just 
what we are. That is the face of New Zealand and many cultures, but 
yeah, generally it’s the Pakeha face that people will see.  
 
Apart from the ‘slippage’ between ‘cultures’ and ‘nations,’ there is a firm recognition 
of ‘multiculturalism as fact,’ and a simultaneous engagement with its political 
implications. Generally, the nation is constructed along a time line. The assumption is 
that ‘we’ cannot progress in a linear fashion until biculturalism is ‘achieved.’ Finally, 
in relation to Michael Billig’s assertion that nationalism is an international ideology 
(1995), Nicole shows a concern with the way other nations see ‘us’ and, implicitly, a 
concern with the ‘metropolitan gaze’ (Turner, 2000), or what is considered ‘the face 
of New Zealand.’ 
 
The critiques in this group were mostly aimed at ‘Pakeha’ as the main source of power 
Huijser – Negotiating Multicultural Difference in a Bicultural Nation 15
within New Zealand’s social and political context. Although similarly drawing 
attention to contradictions inherent in bicultural and multicultural discourses, the 
emphasis in Group 6 veered more towards the economic implications of immigration 
policy, with a particular focus on responsibilities on the part of immigrants, which was 
largely absent in Group 5.  
 
Initially, the discussion about ‘national identity’ in Group 6 followed a similar pattern 
to Group 5. The participants began by questioning the concepts of biculturalism and 
multiculturalism, and the (im)possibility of their coexistence: 
 
Ellie: I don’t know if I should say no to immigration at all. But I just think it’s 
a wrong term to say that we’re bicultural, cause we’re not to me. We’re 
sort of...there’s two...there’s like an indigenous people, and then there’s 
Pakehas. But I mean, the Pakehas are all different cultures anyway; 
they come from different places in the world anyway. There’s Irish and 
English and all sorts... 
 
This extract quite clearly shows the problematic nature of these terms. Initially, Ellie 
draws on the same ‘biculturalism-first’ discourse in an apparently unproblematic way, 
before realising that the two categories that form the basis of this discourse cannot 
ultimately be sustained in terms of ‘culture,’ and could be seen as categories of ‘race,’ 
which is a more contentious concept. 
 
Her reference to immigration subsequently shifted the focus to a discussion of the 
merits of immigration, where a similar discursive ‘slippage’ between ‘culture’ and 
‘race’ can be discerned. For example, while some participants endorsed ‘cultural 
diversity’ as something considered to be ‘healthy,’ this group also developed a 
consensus that this should not come at any cost to the nation in economic terms; in 
other words, immigration should be based on merit in the form of acknowledged 
qualifications:  
 
Linda: I don’t like the formula they use to decide how many people they let in 
each given year. But I think that a good mix has got to make people 
more culturally aware, and that can’t be a bad thing.  
 
She then went on to tell an anecdote about a qualified Indian doctor who cannot get 
work in New Zealand because her qualifications are not recognised. There has been a 
marked increase in these kind of stories in newspapers and on television in the past 
few years, and she appears to critique this situation. However, she seems to then 
contradict herself: 
 
Linda: I think those sorts of things need to be ironed out a bit. But I don’t think 
people should be able to come over here and live off the dole, you 
know? (.) It’s gotta benefit somebody. It [immigration] shouldn’t just 
be a drain for services like medicine and all of that; it shouldn’t be a 
drain.  
 
This is taken up by other participants, and a set of conditions is developed for 
immigration, with a particular focus on language. In this way, the culture aspect of 
‘cultural diversity’ comes to mean culture in the narrow sense of the word. Difference 
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is fine, and even beneficial, but only in its ‘proper’ time and place and on our terms. 
This is a common discourse when it comes to issues of multiculturalism, and 
immigration in particular. Within the models of linear national progression, some 
immigrants (‘they’) are then seen to hold ‘us’ back: 
 
Ellie: I think they [immigrants] should be able to speak English. 
Bill: I think if they come here to New Zealand, they talk our language, they 
learn our language. And there again, it’s up to the individual. If you’re 
going over there, overseas, it’s up to you to learn theirs. You know, our 
language was here, has been here ever since we were here. They come 
here; they learn our language.  
Linda: Well, cause it does put a drain on the resources. Like in education 
resources; that money could be spent on other things.  
Ellie: Yeah, and they’ve made that choice to come here from another country, 
so why should we pay money for them to learn to speak our language? 
 
As mentioned above, this emphasis on responsibilities on the part of immigrants was 
largely absent in Group 5. One possible explanation for this could be that cultural 
diversity in Auckland is a part of ‘everyday’ life, particularly for students, whereas 
Group 6 could be basing their arguments on more mediated accounts. This is made 
explicit in some cases, as in the following extract: 
 
Bill: Well, you look at New Zealand now. You just look in the papers; just 
look on the news. You know, there’s people starving in New Zealand 
overall. There’s people coming from overseas here; they’re taking our 
jobs. You know, we’ve got no homes, a lot of our kids have no homes, 
no money; they’re failing in our schools today. (.) So why let them 
come in and dominate our language and our way of learning? (my 
emphasis) 
Ellie: It’s like, clean up your own backyard first, before you get on with...The 
construction of New Zealand by Bill here stands in direct contrast to 
the earlier image of New Zealand as a ‘paradise’ in the Croatian and 
Chinese groups. In addition, this assumes a win-loss equation in 
relation to immigration: if immigrants (‘they’) enter, then it ‘naturally’ 
follows that ‘we’ suffer. This is unproblematically positioned as 
‘common sense.’  
 
In line with the hypothesis above, when this group turned to a more general discussion 
of ‘the nation,’ immigration was largely deleted because the framework became 
‘bicultural.’ This could be seen as a more accurate reflection of their ‘everyday’ 
context. Consider, for example, the following response to my request to describe New 
Zealand metaphorically as a family: 
 
Linda: Well, the siblings don’t get on (laughter). The older brother thinks that 
the younger, ‘tanned’ brother isn’t as good as the older, white brother 
in certain cases, and thinks that the only way to do things is the older 
brother’s way, you know? They try to get on, but... 
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Firstly, Linda constructs a common version of the nation as running along a linear 
time axis, with associated notions of progress. In terms of gender, this progress is 
constructed as driven by males. She draws specifically on a colonial discourse of 
progress by positioning Pakeha as ‘older.’ The term ‘younger,’ in Linda’s response, 
positions ‘Maori’ as further back in time with relation to this progress, and needing to 
‘catch up.’ At the same time, she offers a ‘postcolonial’ critique of this situation by 
constructing Pakeha as implicitly arrogant and unwilling to form a partnership based 
on equality. This line of argument complements what Aileen Moreton-Robinson has 
called ‘patriarchal white sovereignty’ (2004). 
 
This was subsequently followed by discussions about a variety of topics, from 
politicians to the role of the family, from education to teenage pregnancy, but all of 
these discussions were grounded in a bicultural framework, one which was largely 





Overall, there were significant variations in terms of the kind of discourses on which 
these different groups drew. They were, to some extent, influenced by the different 
micro-contexts of individual groups, or group dynamics. However, some of these 
variations also relate to the positions of these groups on a macro-level, particularly 
their perception of this macro-context.  
 
In some cases, this led to the groups drawing on similar discourses but for differing 
ends and from various perspectives. For example, when Group 6 argues that 
immigrants should not be a ‘drain on our resources,’ and the Croatian groups stress 
that they work hard and integrate well, they both draw on a similar discourse. The 
difference is that Group 6 claims a central position, based on historical continuity, 
against which ‘others’ are defined, whereas the Croatian groups, in this instance, 
define themselves against ‘other’ non-Croatian immigrants, vis-a-vis this centre.  
 
Again, these positionings are never predictable, nor are they always consistent. They 
can overlap and appear contradictory, depending on specific contexts. It would, 
however, be a fallacy to conclude that this is a random process. In a way, it is a highly 
structured process in terms of the discourses on which these groups draw. These 
discourses follow certain patterns that are recognisable and relate to positions of 
power in specific contexts. They are also highly flexible in terms of their 
combinations and representations, which makes them suitable for appropriation in a 
wide variety of contexts, and with a wide variety of effects. This paper has attempted 
to show the complexity of discourses on which different audiences draw when talking 
about a text such as Broken English and its contentious subject matter. This empirical 
research is not representative, but it clearly shows the fluidity of meanings different 
audiences attribute to Broken English. This fluidity, however, is limited to some 
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